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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This is an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah, which has been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals,
pursuant to 78-2a-3(k) Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1992.
This is an action originating in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, involving
a probate matter.
STATEMENT OF THE
ISSUES
1.

The whole of this appeal is a challenge to the

Court's interpretation of Utah Code Annotated, 30-1-4.5 as
Amended in 1987. The standard of review is a question of
law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to
the lower court's determination.

Kimball vs. Campbell,

699 P.2d 714, (Utah, 1985).
2.

To have a common law marriage, the parties must

act and treat one another as if in a marriage, and not merely
as partners enjoying pre-marital sexual relations.

The standard

of review is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness
with no deference to the lower Court's determination, Kimball
supra.
3.

According to the statute, the decedent could have

had an administrative determination that she was in fact in
in a common law marriage, yet on every occasion when dealing
with administrative agencies, she claimed under oath that she
was in fact not married.

The standard of review is a question

of law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to

to the lower Court*s determination. Kimball, supra.
4.

The statute requires that the "marriage" arise out

of a contract between two consenting parties.

The standard

of review is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness
with no deference to the lower Court's determination.

Kimball

supra,
5.

The decedent and Mr. Van Nood, did not assume

marital rights.

The standard of review is a question of law,

and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower
Court's determination.
6.

Kimball, supra.

The decedent and Mr. Van Nood, did not assume

marital duties. The standard of review is a question of law,
and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower
Court's determination.
7•

Kimball, supra,

The decedent and the Appellee did not mutually assume

marital obligations.

The standard of review is a question of law,

and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower
Court's determination.
8.

Kimball, supra.

The Appellee and the decedent did not hold themselves

out as husband ans wife.

The standard of review is a question of

law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower
Court's determination.
9.

Kimball, supra.

The Appellee and the decedent did not acquire a uniform

reputation as husband and wife.

The standard of review is a question

of law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the
lower Court's determination.
10.

Kimball, supra.

The Appellee and the decedent did not acquire a general

reputation as husband and wife.

The standard of review is a question

of law, and i s reviewed for correctness with no deference to the
lower Court's determination.

Kimball, supra.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
30-1-4.5

VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE NOT SOLEMNIZED

(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to
this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or
administrative order establishes that it arises out of
a contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized
marriage under the provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabitated;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties and
obligations, and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage
under this section must occur during the relationship
described in Subsection (1), or within one year following
the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a
marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested
in any form, and may be proved under the same general rules
of evidence as facts in other cases.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal, stemming from a trial on whether a Mr.
Martin Van Nood, was in fact the common law husband of the decedent
Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant, Orin Thomas Sorensen, filed a Petition to

Determine that the Decedent died intestate, and to have himself
appointed as the Personal Representative.

A Mr. Martin Van Nood

and Melvin Gustaveson filed a Counter-Petition objection to the
Petition of the Appellant and requesting that Mr. Van Nood be
appointed the Personal Representative.
The matter came on regularly before the Probate Judge assigned
at the time, who was Judge Richard Moffat, and since there was an
objection filed, the Court transferred the matter to the trial
calendar.

The underlying Judge assigned to the case, was the same

Judge Richard Moffat.,
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT
The matter came on regularly for trial, and after the same
the lower Court held that the decedent was in a common law marriage
with Mr. Martin Van Nood, and therefore he was entitled to inherit
the entire estate.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson, died on October 19, 1992,
leaving no living father, mother, sister or issue. Her sole surviving blood relative is Appellant, Orin Thomas Sorensen.
Susan Gustaveson married a William Gustaveson, and they
divorced on February 22, 1982, with no children stemming from
the said marriage.
The Decedent dated a Mr. Martin Van Nood, and they began
living together.

However, their relationship was somewhat rocky

as she moved in with him, and then lived with someone else, and
moved back in with Mr. Van Nood.

Transcript at page 40.

Appellee had given the Decedent an engagement ring, and they
contemplated getting married sometime before May of 1997, and in
fact they were looking at houses together so that when they got
married they could move into "their" home.
Appellee and the Decedent did not assume any marital rights,
duties or obligations as husband and wife, and they did not hold
themselves out as nor had they acquired a uniform and general
reputation as husband and wife, under the interpretation given
30-1-4.5, which the Appellant believes the State Legislature,
intended.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
In this Appeal, the Appellant submits that the State
Legislature intended a whole different meaning to 30-1-4.5 than
given by the lower Court.
Appellant submits that it was the intent of the State Legislature to recognize commitments made between consenting adults, when
the said commitments were in the nature of permanent relationship
between the same.

Hence, each of the five elements were designed

to reflect an element of permanency, where the parties would do
acts that would reflect a permanent relationship with their partners.
Therefore, the State Legislature required that the parties
do what other married couples do, like borrow money together, own
assets jointly, and have common debts, etc.
None of these long term elements

was present, and hence

each of the issues raised by the Appellant is a question of law,
in that, did the Legislature require more than merely what the
lower Court rely on, when deciding it was a common law marriage.

ARGUMENT ONE
THE WHOLE OF THIS APPEAL IS A CHALLENGE TO THE
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
30-1-4.5 AS AMENDED IN 1987

In this action, Appellant does not challenge the
FINDINGS OF FACT, in so far as they address the facts received
into evidence regarding what the Appellee and the Decedent may
have done before the decedent died on October 19, 1992.
However, these facts are not what the State Legislature
contemplated in determining what constitutes a common law
marriage.
Appellant submits that the State Legislature contemplated
a whole lot more than merely living together for any period of
time and cleaning house, fixing meals, taking out the garbage, etc.
Appellant submits that the State Legislature contemplated
actions that went beyond the day to day living of two people
shacking up together, and required that there be actions by the
parties that reflect a bonding into the future, or a commitment
to one another that was more lasting than merely paying a past
due light bill together.
Appellant submits that the State Legislature contemplated
something beyond a mere convenient sharing of household expenses
and shopping together, and exchanging gifts.

It is clear that what the State Legislature contemplated
was that the parties share checking accounts, savings accounts,
purchase items like cars, or real property, etc., together,
reflecting a relationship tommorrow, not just what is convenient
today.
In this case, essentially each and every FINDING, in
FINDING OF FACT #7, regarding the parties "mutually assuming
marital rights, duties and obligations" involves merely two
people who were living together, contemplating getting married
someday, perhaps someday soon, sharing the costs of a household,
until such time as they would become married to each other:
a.

They engaged in a sexual relationship.

b.

They maintained their home together for themselves

for four and one-half years; and they raised the minor daughter
of the respondent together for three years, until she married
and moved from the family home.

The decedent treated respondent's

daughter as her own daughter, and considered respondent's
grandchild as her own grandchild.
c.

Each contributed financial

support to the

household expenses; and they purchased furniture and home
improvements for themselves.
d.

They received mail together.

e.

They exchanged gifts with each other and family

members; and received gifts from family
f.

members.

They shared in the normal household duties

of a married couple:

cooking, cleaning, home repairs, care

of a child, travel, entertainment both in the home and attendance
of social activities outside of the home with friends and coworkers .
g.

The decedent contributed financial support to

the respondent's
h.

business by purchasing the business computer.

They shared activities as husband and wife with

respondent's child, such as camping, attendance as f,parentsfl
at the child's highschool graduation, marriage, and birth of
her child.
Appellant submits that each and everyone of these
findings are consistent with the engaged couple, contemplating
marriage and moving in with eachother, prior to getting married.
Appellant submits that the lower Court eried, in
this loose interpretation of the Statute, as the State
Legislature contemplated a situation where the parties are treating
their relationship, as if they themselves have a commitment,
without merely saying an flI do."
For example, did the parties borrow money together
reflecting that they were working together in the future with
common goals and directions?
Did the parties buy

anying that involved a title,

like a car or house, or boat, etc., showing that the parties
contemplated a real future together.

Or did the parties talk

about buying a house together, like talking about getting married,
and look at buying a house as an incident of their marriage, ie:
lets get a house together when we get married.

Did the parties share a joint savings or checking
account?

Showing that they had truly merged their individual

interests into a common interest.
Did the parties maintain separate debts and obligations.
So when the decedent borrows money just months before she dies
does she have a single debt of any kind, that the Appellee is
also responsible for, and visa versa.
The State Legislature contemplated that there be
a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties and obligations
and in this case the Court overlooked the expressed intent of
the parties to get married, and concluded that since they
had been having sex for so long, they were married.
Appellant submits that the lower Court also erred,
in reference to the interpretation of f,did the parties hold
themselves out as and did they acquire a uniform and general
reputation as husband and wife," as reflected in FINDING OF
FACT #8:
a.

Neighbors considered them to be husband and wife.

b.

Fellow co-workers and the employer of the decedent

and the former husband of the decedent and his parents regarded
them as husband and wife.
c.

Travel arrangements were made as husband and wife.

d.

They shopped together as husband and wife for

household wares, and for a new home.
e.

They held themselves out as husband and wife to

their friends, relatives, and general public.

Appellant submits that this loose interpretation of
the statute by the lower Court, was also in error, in that this
again was not directed to show that the parties were contemplating
any kind of future together, and therefore the Court should
recognize what the parties themselves have committed to one with
another.
For example, did they ever tell anyone that they
were husband and wife, or did they in fact tell them that they
were engaged.
Did the parties represent when they borrowed money
that they were married, or did they represent the very opposite
of the same and state that they were in fact not married.
Did the parties file their taxes consistent with a
common law marriage, or did they file single returns and pay
outrageously more tax, because they in fact did not hold themselves out as husband and wife.
When the decedent filed for unemployment benefits
just months before she died, did she state under oath that she
was not married, and that there was no one living in her home
with her?
Did the parties always act consistent regarding
their future together, showing a "uniform and general reputation
as husband and wife" or did the decedent merely respond to a
door to door salesman, on only one occasion, that she was Mrs.
Van Nood?

Appellant respectfully submits that this whole appeal
is to the interpretation of the statute, and what the State
Legislature contemplated, when they legitatriized two party's
commitment to each other, without the formality of

having

said, "I do."
Had this been a challenge to the FINDING OF FACT, then
it would be the

Appellant's burden to convince this Court that

the FINDINGS OF FACT are not support by the evidence.

Appellant

"must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite the evidence, the trial court's findings
are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight
of the evidence', thus making them 'clearly erroneous'."

In re

Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d, 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting
State vs. Walker, 743 P.2d, 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
Scharf vs. BMG Corp.,

700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), Harker

vs. Condominium Forest Glen, Inc.,
Ct. App.

Also note

740, P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah

1987) .
However, this is not a challenge to the FINDINGS

OF FACT, it is rather a challenge to the CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
in that the lower Court wrongfully interpreted the provisions
of 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1987.

A challenge to a question of law, or an interpretation of
law, is reviewed for correctness, with no presumption in favor
of the determination by the lower Court.

Kimball vs. Campbell,

699 P.2d 714, (Utah 1985).
Appellant submits that the letter and spirit of
30-1-4.5 requires that the parties treat each other and the world
as if they were already married, and hence the Court should
legitimatize

and validate, what the parties themselves have

committed to.
Hence, the inquiry is what have the parties

done

regarding a commitment to the future together, which should be
blessed by the Court of a valid, legal, marriage commitment.
Appellant submits that the lower Court, merely
looked at how long the parties had been living together, and
what

they had done with day to day expenses, without looking

at all at the future commitment of the parties.
Hence, the relationship of the parties was a mere
engagement to be married, rather than a commitment of bond
and unity, which deserved the acknowledgment of the Court.
Appellant respectfully submits that this Court
should

review the interpretation of the provisions of 30-1-4.5

for correctness and then reverse the determination of the lower
Court, with instructions to probate the estate of the deceased, with
the Brother, Orin Thomas Sorensen, as the sole heir.

ARGUMENT TWO
TO HAVE A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE, THE PARTIES MUST
ACT AND TREAT ONE ANOTHER AS IF IN A MARRIAGE,
AND NOT MERELY AS PARTNERS ENJOYING PRE-MARITAL
SEXUAL RELATIONS
Section 30-1-4.5, Utah Code Annotated, as amended
in 1987, contemplates that the parties consider their relationship
a marriage.
The Statute starts off at the very beginning with the
phase "A marriage, which is not solemnized....11
In this action there is no basis to conclude that the
parties referred or even considered the relationship a marriage.
At page 88 of the transcript, Martin Van Nood, himself
referred to the relationship of the decedent and himself "as
partners."
On cross examination, Marin Van Nood, stated that he
never told Melvin Gustaveson, the one who filled out the decedent's
death certificate, that Martin and Susan were married.
On page 86 of the transcript, on cross examination,
Martin Van Nood stated as follows:
Q.

Did you ever tell Mel that the two of your were

married you and Susan were married?
A.

No.

Q.

Did Susan ever tell Mel, "We're married."?

A.

I don't know.

In fact, Martin Van Nood, stated under oath that
he did not consider himself "married" to the decedent.
On page 39, on cross examination, Martin Van Nood,
stated as follows:
Q.

So you were going to get some -- married some

time between May of f92 and May of f97?
A.

Yes.

The decedent's friend Karen Gallegos, stated on
page 95, that she considered herself the decedent's "best friend,"
on direct examination.
Then on page 96 and page 97, Karen Gallegos on
direct exaimination stated:
Did you observe Susan wearing any jewelry?
Yes.
And

She wore a ruby and diamond ring ---

-- on her left hand.
-- did she ever tell you what the ring symbolized?
It was from Marty, is was real special.

He gave

it to her on Valentine's Day and it was an engagement.

Martin Van Nood's witness Karen Gallegos, stated on
page 101, that he and the decedent were fiances, when asked
if Susan ever referred to Martin Van Nood as her husband?
0.

(by Mr. Dalgliesh) Did Susan, in her conversations

with you, ever refer to Marty as anything other than her husband?
A.

She hated the term boyfriend.

She never said

boyfriend, she — when I was engaged, I liked to call -- like

to call him my fiance, and she -- you know, and she would say,
thatfs -- thatfs the right term, fiance.

She hated the term

boyfriend.
On Cross examination, Karen Gallegos, stated that the
relationship between the parties was not a marriage, but
was "at best his fiance" and "not his wife."
At page 103 is the following, in the transcript:
Q.

So she considered herself at best a fiance to

Martin and not -- not his wife; isn't that correct.?
A.

Yes.

This best friend of the decedent went on to say, that
there was no "marriage" between the parties at the time that
the decedent died, rather they were going to "get married," at
a later time.
At page 110, Karen Gallegos, stated on Cross examination:
Q.

You said that they met in September of '86?

A.

Uh huh.

Q.

Six years later, she's still merely a fiance to

Marty; isnTt that correct?
A.

Well, they're not married; so yes.

Karen Gallegos stated on page 111, that she was never
present when the decedent ever told Melvin Gustaveson, the decedent's
adopted father, that she and Martin Van Nood were married.

As noted above this same Melvin Gustaveson was the
one who filed out the death certificate for the decedent's family,
and he stated therein that the decedent was divorced at the
time of her death.

Note Exhibit 16.

In fact, this Karen Gallegoes goes so far under oath
as to say, what conditions had to exist before the parties were
going to in fact get married.
At page 112, she stated as follows:
0.

Did she tell you when they were going to get

di -- when they were going to get married?
A.

When she got a job and Marty got a job.

Q.

Prior to May of '92, did those two conditions

exist at the same time.
A.

Prior to when11

Q.

May of '92

A.

Well, no, 'cause that -- she was losing her job.

Not only did the decedent's best friend, Karen
Gallegoes testify that the Martin Van Nood and Susan Gustaveson
were not married, but so did Martin Van Nood's witness Kenneth
Atkin, who had been the decedent's friend for many, many years,
ast Kail Radio, where she worked.
At page 138 of the transcript, Mr. Atkin, testified
on cross examination, as follows:
Q.

You say that you know that they were not married?

A.

Right.

Q,

How do you know that?

A.

Well, because I know them both.

I've known

them both for a long time and I think I would have been invited
to the wedding.

I think.

Q.

Did they ever talk to you about

wedding plans?

A.

Yeah. I -- I've heard Susan talk about that,

Q.

And that would be some -- do you know when they

uh huh.

were going to get married?
A.

I have no idea.

Martin Van Nood called Julia Tso, his own daughter
to testify.

She had actually lived with the decedent and Martin

Van Nood for some time.
At page 143, Julia Tso testified as follows:
Q.

Were you aware of plans for them to get married?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When were they going to get married?

A.

I only know that they talked about it.

Q.

Do you know if they ever set any time when they

were going to get married?
A.

I -- I don't know of a time.

Q.

Did they consider one another fiances?

A. Yes.

Appellant submits that the State Legislature mandated
that for there to be a common law marriage, the relationship must
be one in the nature of a marriage.
Appellee testified under oath that they were partners
and that they did not consider themselves Mmarriedff, but that
they were thinking of marriage at a future date.
Appellee even gave the decedent a diamond ring, which
was considered by all that testified to the same as an engagement
ring, symbolizing the commitment to in fact "get married.11
Appellant submits that the whole basis for determining
whether or not a common law marriage ever existed is based upon
the statute with specific requirements, and that the first of
which, that was not met by the Appellee, was proof that the parties
relationship, was a umarriageff to the two parties concerned.
Not only did the APpellee fail in his proof of the
same, by the parties themselves, but everyone,

who testified

as to the same, testifed that a marriage was in the future,
sometime before May of 1997, and not at the time of the decedent's
death.
By virtue of the very specific language of the
statute, and the same being absolutely the only basis for
determining that the parties were in fact in a common law marriage,
Appellant respectfully requests that the lower Court be reversed,
and that the undisputed only living blood relative, Orin Thomas
Sorensen, be declared the sole heir of the estate.

ARGUMENT THREE

ACCORDING TO THE STATUTE, THE DECEDENT COULD HAVE
HAD AN ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION THAT SHE WAS IN
FACT IN AN COMMON LAW MARRIAGE, YET ON EVERY OCCASION
WHEN DEALING WITH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, SHE CLAIMED
UNDER OATH THAT SHE WAS IN FACT NOT MARRIED.
Section 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code Annotated, as
amended in 1987, states in part as follows:
(1)

A marriage which is not soleminized according

to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or
administrative order establishes . . . ,! (emphasis added.)
According to Exhibit 23, submitted by the Appellant,
there is no question that the decedent filed her income taxes
as a single woman.
The Decedent made in excess of thirty thousand dollars,
and could have had the I.R.S. evaluate her marital status, so
that she could have had substantial savings in taxes, yet chose
to have the I.R.S. consider her as single, with no question
or issue raised with the I.R.S.
Appellee testified that the decedent could not
honestly claim anything different than single with the I.R.S.
At page 65, Appellee testified on direct examination
as follows:
Q.

Susan filed a joint, or an individual income tax

return for 1991.
A.

Do you know why?

Well, she was a very honest, forthright person

and I -- she felt that, in the first place, the I.R.S. probably

wouldn't accept as a -- as part of joint return.

And we did

discuss -- she was in a very high tax bracket being classified
as single and she made decent money at work, and so paid a lot
of taxes, but didnft get much back.

We discussed several --

several methods that we could get her a better tax break..
We talked about joint returns but that didn't seem like one
of the feasibilities,

but were other methods that we talked

about that night -- would have helped her.
Under the clear mandate of the State Legislature, that
one can have their relationship declared a valid marriage,
but only did the decedent intentionally not do the same on a
federal level, she claimed the exact same "not married" status
a matter on the State level as well.
On July 6, 1992, just months before Susan Gustaveson
died, she applied for unemployment benefits from the State of
Utah.
In doing so, she signed Exhibit #2, under oath, declaring
that the basis, in part for her benefits, was that she was not
"married" and not "single" and not "separated" and not "widowed",
but that she was in fact, "divorced."
One would think that she could have enhanced her claim
for benefits by claiming that she had others to support, and
therefore much more in need of the unemployment benefits.

As will be noted elsewhere in this brief, she did
not either fill out the application as a "Van Nood", nor sign
the document as a "Van Nood", and furthermore, she stated
that her name was "Gustaveson" which was the name of her first
husband, and that she was in fact "divorced" at the time of
filing in July 1992.
Appellant submits that the decedent, on every
occasion, involving all of the evidence before the lower Court,
when called upon to certify under oath to any "administrative"
agency, certified her marital status, as divorced/single as she
everytime stated under oath that she was not married.
Surely there can be no question that she would have
reaped substantial dividends from the I.R.S. if should could
claim either the benefit of Joint Return, or the benefit of
additional dependents.
Appellee testifed that there were substantial gains
to be had, had the decedent been able to legitimately claim that
she was filing a joint return, etc. The statute is absolutely
clear that she could have so claimed, still Appellee stated that
she did in fact, not do the same, because she was honest, and
could not claim the benefit of being "married" because she in
fact was not married.
The lower Court wholly ignored this undisputed
evidence.

Evidence, Appellant submits, is the decedent's own

sworn statements, either prepared by her own hand, or by her agent
at her instructions, and in the case of the unemployment benefits,
just a few short months before she died.
Appellant submits that it is the statute that mandates

the terms and condition of whether or not a common law marriage
existed, and the statute is absolutely clear that the marriage
can be determined by "administrative order11, yet the decedent
clearly chose to remain not married, when substantial sums were
at risk, and in fact surely lost, by decedent1s overt sworn statements that she was in fact not married.
Appellant respectfully submits that there is no

basis

for this Court to ignore the undisputed sworn statements by the
decedent that she was in fact not married, immediately before
she died, and therefore this Court should reverse, with instructions
that the Appellant is the sole survivor of the estate.

ARGUMENT FOUR
THE STATUTE REQUIRES THAT THE "MARRIAGE" ARISE OUT
OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN TWO CONSENTING PARTIES.
The State Legislature, mandated that the marriage relationship arise out of a contract between consenting parties.
In this action, the relationship between the parties was
without any question, was a contract to get married, rather
than a contract of existing marria,ge.
On page 64, Appellee testified that he purchased an
engagement ring for the decedent, and that it represented their
contract.

Then on page 69, he stated that getting married was

"in our future plans."
Then on page 72, the Appellee testified that they had
not set a specific date, by the time that she had died, but had

instead established a time interval.
Q.
So she decided against, at least for now, up
to the time she died, she was against getting married to you; is
that correct?
A.

No. That's not correct.

Q.
Then was is correct then that she wanted to get
married to you then?
A,

We had it in out plans, yes.

Q.

Had you set a date:

A.

No.

On page

We did have a time interval, but not a date.
88 and following the Appellee further explains

when the parteis intended to be married:
Q.
So in 1988, you start talking about it, she dies
October f92 and she's still not agreeing to get married fair?
A.

No, I don't think so.

Q.

You hadn't set a date?

A.

We'd set a time frame.

Q.

You set a time frame that you were going to get

married?
A.
Q.

Yes.
And when was that?

A.
We have a five -year
solemnization of our relationship.)

plan that called for

Q.

So when were you going to get married?

A.

We had no date,

Q.

And when did the five years begin?

A.

May of '92.

Q.
So you were going to get some-married some time
between May of '92 and May of !97?
A.

Yes.

Appellant submits that it is crystal clear, that had
the parties felt that they were married and husband and wife, etc.,
nothing further was needed.
Appellee testified that saying "I do11 was too hard,
and it was very undesirable to both the Appellee and the decedent,
yet it was something that both felt was necessary.
Hence, the inescapeable conclusion is that they knew they
did not have a legal, valid marriage, because of the undisputed
evidence.
Even is one were to state that their ignorance of the
statutory law is an excuse, they surely were aware of the prevailing notion in America of what is thought of as a common law
wife and a common law husband.
The lower Court in its ruling from the Bench placed
great significance on whether the decedent and the Appellee even
knew of the statute.
Appellant submits that their knowledge or lack of
knowledge of the subject statute is of no importance, as the
State Legislature sets forth the criteria to be strickly adhered
to, and in the conjunctive no less, and whether someone is aware
of the difference factors or not, makes no difference whatsoever.
It is the facts as they were between the decedent and
the Appellee, as applied against the law, not the otherrwayaround.
Hence, they either had a

,T

marriage!! that would "arise

out of a contract11 or they did not, and in this case there is just
absolutely no question that the engagement ring was just that, "an
engagement ring."

One I am sure was cherished by the decedent, as

reflected in the testimony of Karen Gallegoes, but at best they
were engaged, and perhaps even promised to each other, but married
thay were not, as the "contract" was one in the nature of a
commitment to "get married" rather than one of "already being
married."
Appellant respectfully requests that the determination
by the lower Court be reversed, with instructions to the lower
Court, to establish the Appellant as the sole heir of the decedentfs
estate.

ARGUMENT FIVE
THE DECEDENT AND MR. VAN NOOD, DID NOT ASSUME
MARITAL RIGHTS
In this action, the parties did not assume any
marital rights with each other.
When it came to them having a joint ZC1II,credit card,
the decedent had the same in her name only.

Note Exhibit 1.

As

to the R.C. Willey account to purchase furnishings and furniture
the decedent had the same in her name only.

Note Exhibit 4.

As

to the ownership of the items of real property, Mr. Van Nood held
his property in his name only, and the decedent held her Condo in
her name only.

Exhibit 5.

When it was time to finance the

home of the decedent, she was the only signature on the loan, and
Mr. Van Nood had no part of the benefits of the same.
Exhibit 6.

Note

As to the benefit of a Cheveron charge card, Mr. Van

Nood had no benefits from the same, as it was in the decedents name
only.

Note Exhibit #8.

The decedent had two charge accounts for

Double Day Book Club, which Mr. Van Nood had no benefit or
right to use.

Note Exhibit #11.

The decedent had an account

at Tel America, which was solely in her name, Note Exhibit #15.
The decedent had an account at yasatch Mountain Credit Union,
which was solely for her and not Mr. Van Nood, nor the both of
them.

Note Exhibit #19.

Even the Utah Power and Light account

was in the decedent's name only.

Exhibit #20.

One may argue that she had these accounts before and
merely never got around to putting the same in their joint names.
However, this argument is without merit, because Mr. Van Nood
claimed to be

fl

marriedM to the decedent dating back to 1988, some

four full years before she died.

As noted in the record many

of the accounts were updated in the later years of her life, with
no attempt to make them joint accounts.
As noted above, the decedent did not claim to be
married nor to have any dependants (as noted in the transcript
Mr. Van Nood was out of a job) when she filed her income tax
for the year 1992.
Perhaps the most telling reason why the lower Court
erred, in reference to "mutually assume marital rights11 is found
in Exhibit #18.
According to this exhibit, the decedent applied for
a loan with Trans West Credit Union, on May 5, 1992, some four
months or so before she died.
In this application for a loan, she stated that her
name was "Gustaveson" and not Van Nood.
or joint owner."

She listed no Mco-maker

She put nothing in the slot for "No of Dependents."

She listed her car only, when there was a slot for her car and
any co-maker or joint owner's car.

(This would be a substantial

omitance, because this is to be anunsecured loan.)

Where it

calls for "Nearest relative - not living with youM she lists
Appellant, and then in reference to "Name & Address of Personal
+ Not a relative" she list the Appellee, with his address and
his phone number, which is different than the ones listed for
herself.
As to the Credit information, and Outstanding Debts,
she does not list a single debt of Mr. Van Nood, as will be
discussed below.
Towards the and of Exhibit #18, the Decedent stated "No"
when asked if "Are you a guarantor or co-maker of any leases,
contracts or debts."
The decedent was a sophisticated person, and was well
aware of how lending institutions rely

on credit information,

as she was trained as a Real Estate Agent.

Note the transcript

at page 28.
This becomes even more significant, because she refused
to put Mr. Van Noodfs name on her Condo, as did Mr. Van Nood
refuse to put her name on his house.

Note the transcript at

page 43.
On page 76 in the transcript, Mr. Van Nood stated that
he had not even seen the Exhibit #18 until it was supplied to him,
through discovery, yet on the following page she admits that
the purpose of the loan was to make changes to the Condo, which
was exclusively in her name.

On page 80 of the transcript the Appellee was asked
about any debts, contracts or leases that involved him and the
decedent, and he admitted that there were none.
Q.
Okay. Now, let me concentrate there. She told
the truth then in May 5th, 1992, that she didnft have any joint
applications for debts, contracts or leases with you?
A.

None with me.

Then on page 86 and 87 of the transcript the Appellee
stated the following:
Q.

Did the two of you own any land or buildings

A.

No. We didn't.

Q.

Did you own any personal property together?

together?

A.
We bought household goods together, so I guess
ownership would be joint.
Q.
and her name?

Did you ever have any titles that were in your name

A.

That would mean like real property or vehicles or

Q.

Anything you need a title for.

something?

A.
Anything you need a title for?
can't think of anything.
Q.

I don't -- I

Any you told us that you didn't have joint checking

accounts?
No joint accounts.
No joint savings accounts?
No. No joint credit -No joint credit cards?
Correct.
Appellee called his business partner Mr. Harley Sells
to testify, who stated on page 122 of the transcript that the

decedent never took on any business debt of Mr. Van Nood, and
had no imput in the business decisions of Mr. Van Nood.
Appellant submits that when the State Legislature, pened
the elements of 30-1-4.5 (d) involving

ff

mutually assume marital

rights. . ." they really keyed into when there is and when there
is no common law marriage, because in this case, the ownership of
a home together, was clearly and incident of marriage to the
decedent and the Appellee.
On page 118, the Appellee's business partner Mr. Harley
Sells, testified on direct as follows:
Q
did they ever ask you, sir, to help them in
their domestic life?
A.
Yes. They asked me to contact a realtor for them
they were going to buy a house together. And I contacted a
realtor, arid.that -- she did drive them around looking at houses.
Then on cross examination, on pages 122 and 123, the
same Mr. Sells testified as follows:
Q.
Do you know if they contemplated actually getting
married at some time?
A.

Yes, I believe I do.

Q.

When were they going to get married?

A.
I don't know when, but the real estate agent did
comment to me later that they had talked of marriage in their
car, in her car, while they were looking at houses.
Hence, Appellant submits that this falls squarely into
the notions promulgated by the State Legislature, in that they
were getting a home as part of their immediate future plans, just
like they would be getting married in their immediate future plans,
and that was why Appellee had given the decedent an engagement
ring.

Appellant submits that this clear incident of marriage
was futuristic, just as were their marriage plans, and hence, they
were not already in a common law marriage, and the lower Court must
be reversed, with instructions to probate the estate of the decedent
with the Appellant as the sole heir.

ARGUMENT SIX
THE DECEDENT AND MR. VAN NOOD, DID NOT ASSUME
MARITAL DUTIES
Not only as stated in Argument Five above, did the
Appellee state that they had no mutuality in "marital rights,ff
he confirmed the same on page 44 of the transcript on direct
examination by Mr. Dalgleish:
Q.
You and Susan -- did you and Susan maintain joint
or separate financial accounts?
A.

Separate.

Q.

Did you have any j o i n t

A.

No.

accounts?

Appellant submits that not only did the decedent and
Mr. Van Nood have no mutuality in T?marital rights11, they
similarly had no mutuality in f,marital duties."
They not only considered their property as being
absolutely separate when it came time to repair the automobile
of Mr. Van Nood

Susan Gustaveson paid for the same, and then

Appellee paid her back.

Not at all like a husband and wife.

Note

page 49, where the Appellee is testifying on direct examination:
Q.
Did you have dealings, you and Susan, with Morgan's
Sportscar West?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what dealings was that?

A.
Well, Susan and I belonged to the British Motorcar
Club, primarily cause I — I own a British automobile, and she
was kind enough while I was in Wyoming to take it in for servicing.
Q.

And who paid for that?

A.
I -- I did, I -- but I think I -- I think she
paid for it and then I reimbursed her is how it worked.
Q.
I'll show you what's been marked as Defendant's
Exhibit 6 and ask you what that is?
A,
Well, it's a work order made out to Marty Van
Nood - Susan, made out by Mike Morgan, one of the partners in
the car repair shop.
Q.

And do you recognize Susan's signature?

A.

That is her signature.

According to the Appellee himself, not only were
the decedent and Mr. Van Nood careful about keeping their rights
and obligations separate when it came to personal property, he
also testified that such was the case with all of their property.
On page 78 of the transcript, Mr. Van Nood testified
on cross examination as follows when discussing the payment on
the mortgage for the Condo which was exclusively in her name:
Q.
Okay. Every time she paid First Federal, she
wrote a check, did she not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Wrote it on her own account?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you were not a joint signatory on that account?

A.

No sir.

Appellant submits that according to Appellee himself, he
and the decedent took on no mutuality when it came to assuming marital

duties.
They not only never comingled their monies, they never
commingled their accounts, their debts, nor there personal nor
real property.
Yet the State Legislature clearly stated for there to
be a common law marriage there must be a mutuality in the assumption
of marital duties, and in this case, there was absolutely none of
the same, and therefore this matter must be reversed, with
instructions to probate the subject estate with the Appellant as
the sole heir.

ARGUMENT SEVEN
THE DECEDENT AND THE APPELLEE DID NOT MUTUALLY
ASSUME MARITAL OBLIGATIONS
Appellant submits that not only is the record absolutely
clear on the fact that the decedent and the Appellee did not at
any time assume "marital duties", the record is equally abundantly
clear that they never mutually assumed "marital obligations.!!
As noted on page 44 of the transcript, Appellee testified
that they carefully maintained their separate financial matters,
when it came to savings, etc.
On page 80, the Appellee confirmed the same when it came
to "marital oligations" when he testified on cross examination
as follows in reference to Exhibit #8:
Q.
Okay. You -- is this a refinance to bring certain
debts into consolidation; do you know?
A.

Yeah:

Q.
Okay. So from all you know then, she was going
to pay off the R.C. Willey debt with this loan?
A.

I have no doubts.

And in fact, I believe that

Q.

R.C. Willey was exclusively her debt; isn't that

she did.
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Let's go down below. Are you a guarantor or a
co-maker of any leases, contracts or debts? And she says no.
Now, is that true?
A.
Co-maker of any leases, contracts or debts.
say that's true.

Ifs

Q.
Okay. Now, let me concentrate there. She told
the truth then in May 5th, 1992, that she didn't have any joint
applications for debts, contracts or leases with you.
A.

None with me.

Appellee claimed to be involved in a common law marriage
with the decedent because they had gone on so many vacations
together, in that they travelled a lot.
However, a careful review of the record will show that
the way that they would travel would confirm that they were not in
a common law marrige, because they very meticulously took on various
obligations, in a manner and fashion that was totally inconsistent
with being a "married couple.11
As noted on page 50 of the transcript, the Appellee
testified, that they did not travel like any married couple with
there being a sole source in which to pay for the obligations
associated with the subject travel, rather the decedent would
meticulously pay her part by paying for "lodging and entertainment"
and the Appellee would pay for "transportation^and meals."
According

to the Appellee even during times that the

decedent and Mr. Van Nood were out relaxing and away from everyone,
in New York, and Boston and Connecticut, and Los Angeles, etc.,
they had a business relationship which called for one to pay
for one kind of debt and the other to pay for the other kind of debt.
Clearly, there is no basis to conclude that they "mutually
assumed marital obligations," and therefore this Court must reverse
and remand with instructions to probate the subject estate with
the Appellant as the sole heir.

ARGUMENT EIGHT
APPELLEE AND THE DECEDENT DID NOT HOLD THEMSELVES
OUT AS HUSBAND AND WIFE
Under Utah Code Annotated 30-1-4.5(e), for there to be
a common law marriage, the parties must Mhold themselves out as . .
. .husband and wife."
As noted above with the income tax return Exhibit #23,
and the unemployment compensation application, Exhibit #2, the
parties clearly did not hold themselves out as "husband and wife."
A review of all of the exhibits produced by the Appellant,
one through twenty three reflect the fact that the decedent clearly
did not represent herself to be the wife of Martin Van Nood.
Not only does the physical evidence, by way of Exhibits
admitted into evidence clearly establish that the parties did not
hold themselves out to be "husband and wife", the Appellee confirmed
that same on many occasions, during the trial.
At page 65 of the transcript, Appellee testified on
direct examination, that the decedent could not honestly represent

to the I.R.S. that she was married, or that she was entitled
to file her taxes by way of a joint return.
0.
Susan filed a joint, or an individual income tax
return for 1991, Do you know why?
A.
Well, she was a very honest, forthright person
and I -- she felt that, in the firest place, the I.R.S. probably
wouldn't accept as a -- as part of a joint return. And we did
discuss -- she was in a very high tax bracket being classified
as single and she made decent money at her work, and so paid a
lot of taxes, but didn't get much back. We discussed several -several methods that we could get her a better tax break. We
talked about joint returns., but that didn't seem like one of
the feasibilities, but were other methods that we talked about
that might -- would have helped her."
Appellant submits that not only did the decedent feel
that a joint return as a married couple was dishonest, so did the
Appellee, as he stated that they discussed the same, and knew that
it was wrong, because it was not true.
As noted on Exhibit 18, and also on page 76 of the
transcript, the decedent stated, just months before she died in
a credit application that Martin Van Nood, was a "Personal Friend Not a Relative."
As noted on Exhibit 2, and on pages 81 and 82 of
the transcript, the decedent clearly did not consider herself
the wife of Martin Van Nood, just months before she died.:
0.
(By Mr. Walsh) She applies for workmen's -- or
excuse me, for unemployment benefits, and she signs it down here
on 7-6-92, Susan R. Gustaveson; fair?

A.

Fair.

Q.

You can see right here - -

A.

Right.

Q.

-- Susan R. Gustaveson here; fair?

A.

Uh huh.

Q.
Now, in reference to the darkened area here, they
asked her a question to fill out regarding her marital status. You
see where it says married, single, divorced, separated, widowed; do
you see that there on Exhibit No. 2?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Same area that we're talking about here on the
blownup of Exhibit #2, in this particular area; isn't that correct?
A.

Looks like the same area.

Q.
And when she filled out for unemployment benefits
in July of ! 92, just three, four months before she died, she said
that she was not married, not single, nor separated, nor widowed, but
divorced, didn't she, Marty?
A.

That's what she marked.

Appellee testified that she would go by the surname
Van Nood, and he would go by the surname of Gustaveson, but only
when the parties would travel to remote places.
In fact, Appellee could only remember a single time
in all of the six years that they dated, etc., that the decedent
ever admitted that she was a "Van NoodTf, and even then it was
not like she told someone that her name was Susan Van Nood, rather
someone came to the door and asked for Mrs. Van Nood, and
responded, what do you want.

she

Note pages 91 and 92, with the

Appellee on cross examination:
Q.

Other than to travel, did Susan ever go by your name?

A.

I can only remember one specific occasion.

Q.

When was that?

A.
It was at the house, 2400 South, a door-to-door
salesman came by and asked for Mrs. Van Nood, and she acknowledged,
What do you want?
Q.

Did she ever sign anything saying she was Susan

A.

No. She wouldn't do that, I don't think.

Van Nood?

Q.
A.
standards.

Why not?
Here again, I believe it was against her -- her

Appellant submits that according to the Appellee, it
would be immoral and dishonest for the decedent to hold herself
out as the wife of Martin Van Nood.
Not only did the Appellee so testify, so did Karen
Gallegoes, who considered the decedent as a best friend.
On pages 104 and 105 of the transcript with Karen
Gallegoes testifying on cross examination is the following:
Q.
Did you and she talk about the fact that Martin
Van Nood was not a relative, was just a personal friend?
A.

No.

Q.
Is that a fair statement as to what the relationship
was between Susan and Martin Van Nood?

recognize

A.

Just.a friend?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

No.

Q.

Susan was a very honest person, wasnft she.

A.

Yes. She was.

Q.
And when she would have signed here -- you would
that signature, wouldn't you?
A.

That's hers.

Q.
And she would of course, tell the truth when she
filled out this, wouldn't she?
A.

I would think so.

Q.
And so as far as you know, she considered Martin a
personal friend and not a relative; isn't that correct?
A.

Correct. Not a relative.

Q.
And that would be the case up to the time she died
in October of 1992, isn't that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Appellee called Jet Kensington to testify, who had
lived in the apartment complex where the decedent resided before
she died.
On cross examination at page 128, Mr. Jet Kensington,
stated as follows:
Q.

Did Susan ever go by the

name of Van Nood?

Not to my knowledge.
Do you know if Martin ever went by the last name
Gustaveson?
A

Not to my knowledge.

You say that they held themselves out to be
Q
husband and wife; do you remember saying that?
nowadays

Well, I don't know what the implication means
of what a husband and wife are.
Q.

You observed that they were good friends?

A.

I took them to be a family.

Q.

Did they ever tell you that they were married?

A.

No.

Q.

Did Susan ever say she was the wife of Marty?

A.

Not to me, no.

Appellant submits that the Appellee has the burden of
proof, to show that the decedent and he held themselves out as
"husband and wife.u
However, he testified to the contrary, the decedent's
best friend testified to the contrary, and the Appellee's witness
from the apartment complex where she lived until she died, testified
to the contrary.

In addition to all of the above, essentially on every
occasion when the decedent was to respond to the question of
her marital status, and whether she was married to Martin Van
Nood, she without any exceptions represented to the world that
she was

f,

divorcedM from a William Gustaveson, and was not the

wife of Martin Van Nood, on any Exhibit submitted to the Court.
The State Legislature, mandated the criteria, that
the parties

,f

hold themselves out as husband and wife.11

and this

was clearly not the case before the lower Court, and therefore
this Court must reverse, and remand with instructions to probate
the estate with the Appellant as the sole heir.

ARGUMENT NINE
APPELLEE AND THE DECEDENT DID NOT ACQUIRE A
UNIFORM REPUTATION AS HUSBAND AND WIFE.
According to the State Legislature not only must the
Appellee and the decedent Mhold themselves out as husband and
wife'1 they must have acquired a f,uniform reputation as husband
and wife.M
Appellant respectfully submits that since they did not
hold themselves out as husband and wife, it follows that they
could not have a "uniform reputation as husband and wife.M
Still, independent of the same, the parties had not
acquirred a "uniform reputation as husband and wife.!!
On page 28, the sister-in-law of the decedent testified
on direct examination as follows:
Q.
Did she ever -- did you and she ever have a
discussion wherein she said she was married or considered herself
married to Martin Van Nood?

A.

No.

Q.
Do you know anybody else, prior to the time she
passed away, that had that belief.
A.

Not to my knowledge.

Not only did

the sister-in-law of the decedent so

testify, so did the Appellant.

The same individual listed on

the credit application for a loan as Exhibit #18, so state on
page 34:
Q.
Did you -- were you ever under the understanding
that she was married to Martin Van Nood?
A.

No.

Q.
Do you "know anybody that had the belief that she
was married to Martin Van Nood?
A.

No.

Not only did the "Nearest relative - Not living with
you" and her own sister-in-law, testify that they did not consider
her to be the wife of Martin Van Nood, the Appellee testified
that she told the truth, when she herself represented under oath,
just months before she died that she was in fact not the Appellee!s
wife.
Note for example on page 83 and 84 of the transcript
with the Appellee testifying on cross examination:
Q.
Well, let's talk about that for a minute. When
she applies for workmen1s -- or unemployment compensation, not
one dime of what shefs entitled to is affected by her marital
status, isn't that correct, Marty?
A.

I'm not sure, really.

Q.
Why would she say she's divorced if she thought
she was married to you?

the truth?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

But you will certify that she always told the

A.

I never knew her to lie.

Q.
Let's go on
2, do you see that?
A.

to page 2.

Page 2, Exhibit, Plaintiff's

Uh huh.

Q.
See here in this column on the far right column
where it says family income and it shows a dash, does it not?
A.

Yes, it does.

Q.
Reflecting that there was no family income and
that's why she was applying for work - for unemployment benefits;
isn't that correct?
A.

She was unemployed.

Q.
But she considered --in answer to the question
family income, she shows nothing.
A.
I -- she didn't do that, that I know of.
just a print-out, isn't it?

That's

Q.
Well, it's a print-out of what she supplied them.
Exhibit 2 supplied, which you'll see on the face, of what they
have there, what information she supplied them.
A.

Uh huh.

Q.
And in reference to what she supplied them, she
shows no family income.
A.

I see that that's shown on the paper, yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

One.

Q.

It says live-in, "N" meaning no; is that correct?

A.

I don't know what that means.

It also says family size, one.

Q.
Well, if you'll look at the other columns here
where it uses the term "Nn disabled, migrant, seasonal, public
assistance, JTPA, DLW all show the "N". Here where it says citizen
it shows a "Y" for yes, does it not?

what --

A.

Yes, it does.

Q.

Do the "Y" would be yes, "N" would be no, from

A.

It sounds logical, yeah.

Q.
Okay. So she!s representing in July that there!s
one member of her family and there's no family income; is that
correct?
A.

According to that, I'd say yes.

As noted above the State Legislature, mandated that
the parties "have acquired a uniform reputation as husband and
wife" for bhere to be a common law marriage.
In this case, if there was any uniformity at all
on the subject it was pretty uniform that the decadent and the
Appellee were in fact not husband and wife.
As noted above, on page 91 and 92, of the transcript
the Appellee himself stated that the decedent would have thought
it was dishonest to sign her name as Van Nood.
Q.

Did she ever sign anything saying she was Susan

A.

No. She wouldn't do that, I don't think.

Q.

Why not?

A.

Here again, I believe it was against - her standards.

Van Nood?

Hence, the uniform position of the parties themselves is
that the decedent never signed her name as Susan Van Nood.
However, not only was such the testimony at trial from
the Appellee himself, such was the testimony of the decedent's
best friend, Karen Gallegoes, at page 102;
Q.
Susan never took on the name of Martin --or
Van Nood; did she?
A.

No.

Q.

Martin never took on the name of Gustaveson, did he?

A.

No.

Not only was the testimony from the decedent's best
friend, Karen Gallegoes, that there was uniformity in them not
being husband and wife, so was that exact same uniformily on there
not being husband and wife, from Martin Van Nood's side of life.
Harley Sells, the business partner of Mr. Van Nood,
testified on page 121, as follows:
Q.
Did you ever know that she did, ever seen anything
like that where she said it was Susan Van Nood?
A.

No.

Q.
Did you ever perceive that Marty went by the last
name of Gustaveson?
A.

I -- no.

Appellant submits that the record was absolutely clear
that there was uniformity it is true, but uniformity the case
that the parties did not acquire a reputation as husband and wife.
Such was the testimony of the Appellee, talking about
himself and the decedent.

Such was the case with the decedent's

best friend and such was the case with Martin Van Nood!s business
partner.
Still the burden of proof is on the Appellee to establish
the evidence just the otherway around, and having failed in his
burden of proof to show that the decedent and the Appellee "acquired
a uniform reputation as husband and wife" this Court must reverse
and remand with instructions to probate with the Appellant as
the sole heir.

ARGUMENT TEN
APPELLEE AND THE DECEDENT DID NOT ACQUIRE A
GENERAL REPUTATION AS HUSBAND AND WIFE
According to 30-1-4.5(e), not only must the decedent
and the Appellee Mhold themselves out as husband and wife" and
that they have "acquired a uniform reputation as husabnd and wife"
but the Appellee must establish that the parties have "acquired
a general reputation as husband and wife."
As noted above, the decedent was married at one time
to a William Gustaveson, and then divorced.

She however remained

close to her in-laws after the Divorce.
On page 111, Karen Gallegoes described the relationship
of the decedent with her past father-in-law, Melvin Gustaveson,
on Cross examination as follows:
Okay.
close, dear friend?

At the time that she died, Mel was a very

A

Right.

Q

Almost family?

A

Right.

Q

Perhaps best described as ex-family; correct?

A.
I would -- well, no, I donft think so. Why,
because she got a -- I donft think because she got a divorce,
somebody1s considered ex; but he was a very good friend.
Melvin Gustaveson testified similarly on pages 145
and 146 of the transcript:
Q.

What would you -- how did you treat Susan?

A.

As part of my family.

Q.
Did you consider her as a daughter-in-law, or as a
daughter, or --

A.
activities.

As a daughter.

She Stayed with all of our family

Q.
At -- approximately how often would you see her
after the divorce from your son?
A.

A minimum of two or three times a month

Q.

She was always family.

A.

Two.

How .many other daughters do

you have?

Q.
And did you consider Susan on an equal footing
with your two other daughters?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And did she reciprocate that feeling to you?

A.

Oh, you bet.

Q.

She considered you as her father?

A,
Mom and Dad.

She used to call us Mom and Pop, all the time,

Q.

And she felt the same way towards your wife?

A.

Yes.

Not only did the decedent's best friend Karen Gallegoes
so testify, as did Melvin Gustaveson, but so did the Appellee
so testify on page 85:
Q.

Do y<?u know

who filled out the death certificate?

No.
The person we are talking about is Mel Gustaveson;
correct?
A

Oh.

Q

Okay.

Of course.

I saw that on there, yeah.

So1, Mel Gustaveson would be the closest

friend that you're telling us about on direct examination; isn't
that correct?
A.
Friend isn't the right term, but
person to her.

a very close

Q.
Okay. I don!t want to argue with you, but why
isn t "friend" appropriate to describe Mel's relationship
with her?
f

A.

She called him Dad.

Q.

So it!s closer than

A.

I'd say it is, yes.

friendship?

Q.
Okay. Mel, when he supplies the information as
reflected on Plaintiff1s Exhibit 15, doesn't say she's married
when she dies, does he?
A.

No, he doesn't

Q.

He says ithat she's divorced - -

A.

Yes.

Hence, in regards to the decedent and the Appellee
having "acquired a general reputation as husband and wife" it is
absolutely clear that the person who was "family to the decedent"
represented on the Death Certificate, not that she was married
to Martin Van Nood when she died, rather her "father" stated that
she was divorced from his own son.
Not only did this immediate family address the "general
reputation" of the

Appellee and the Decedent, so did the daughter

of the Appellee by a prior marriage.
According to the daughter of Mr. Martin Van Nood, who
lived with the decedent and her father for some time, and who
called the decedent her Mom, etc, as found on pages 140 and 141
of the transcript, the decedent and the Appellee did not have
a general reputation as husband and wife, as they only represented
themselves as such, when they traveled.
On pages 143 and 144, Julia Tso, testified as follows:

Q

Did Susan go by the name of Van Nood?

A

Van Nood.

Q

Excuse me, did she ever go by that name?

A

Not -- not to my knowledge.

Q
Gustaveson?
A.

I know of --

And did Martin ever go by the last name of
Just on their trips is all I know.

Not only did essentially all who testified state that
they had not acquired a Tfgeneral reputation as husband and wif e",
but perhaps most importantly, so did the exhibits reflecting what
the decedent herself stated under oath shortly before she died.
Karen Gallegoes went with the decedent to file for
unemployment benefits together, and Karen Gallegoes testified
on page 103 and 106 of the transcript as follows:
Q.

So she considered herself at best a fiance to

Martin and not -- and not his wife, isnft that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, she took out a credit application in 1992.

Did you and she talk about that?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Go down in May of f 92, it would be around the

time that things were falling apart there at KALL Radio -A.

Right.

Q.

-- isn't that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And do you know if -- in that regard, if she

would represent herself as being married or single?

A.

Single.

Q.
So at the time of May of '92, she considered
herself a single person; isn't that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.
At the time that she died, she considered herself
a single person, didn't she?
A.

That's correct.

Q.
Okay. Drawing your attention to Page 2 of
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, over on the left-hand column says that
her family income is zip; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Family size was one, is that correct?

A.

Yes. Well, if it says one, it says one.

Hence, Appellant submits that if there was any proof
of the general reputation as husband and wife" it was the general
reputation that they were not, as such was the testimony of the
decedent's "father", the decedent's daughter by association; the
decedent herself and the Appellee himself.
There is absolutely no basis whatsoever for the lower
Court to hold that the decedent and the Appellee "acquired a
general reputation as husband and wife", and therefore this Court
must reverse and remand with instructions that the probate be
completed with the Appellant as the sole heir.

CONCLUSION
In this action, the Appellant went forward with his
case first by stipulation, notbecause he had any burden of proof
whatsoever, but merely for convenience sake.

This was because

it was a probate matter, and the title for the parties did not

fall neatly into place with the terms Plaintiff/Defendant.
The Appellee was required to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that there was a common law marriage.
The only way that one can be in a common law marriage
is if they meet the specific requirements of 30-1-4.5. Each
and every element must be met, for if there is a failure to meet
any one of the criteria, then there is no common law marriage.
The Appellate Courts have reviewed the provisions of
30-1-4.5 in only four cases.

None of the same shed any light

on the interpretation of the statute, except to say that the only
way one can be in a common law marriage in Utah, is by strict
compliance with the statute.

Note Mattes vs. Olearain,
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P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988) , Barber vs. Barber, 792 P.2d 134,
(Utah App. 1990), Walters vs. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App.
1991), and Van Per Stappen vs. Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335
(Utah App. 1991).
In this case, what the decedent said both in a loan
application in May of '92, and in a claim for unemployment benefits
in July, 1992, should be dispositive, as she died in October, 1992.
Clearly, under oath, and just months before she died
she certified that they were not husband and wife; that they did
not mutually assume marital rights, duties and obligations; and
that they did not hold themselves out as and had

not acquired a

uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
Appellee gave her a engagement ring, which was
considered by the world to be a commitment to get married.

In

fact, the decedent and the Appellee went looking for their new
home together, as they were going to be getting married, and
they would need a home that would be theirs together.

Not the

I own mine and you 0wn yours, as it had been in the past.
These folks did absolutely nothing to suggest that
they had already made a commitment of marriage to one another.

They

did not commingle their accounts, they had no contracts for debts,
they had absolutely nothing to suggest that they had a marriage
here and now, as opposed to a marriage into the future, when
they get their new house, etc.
Appellant submits that the policy of the State
Legislature is that since the parties have themselves entered
into a marriage of accounts, debts, duties, obligation, etc.,
the Courts should acknowledge the same.
Here, there is no mutuality at all, except two young
folks who move in together, and pay the day to day expenses,
individually from very separate and distinct accounts.
Appellant submits that the lower Court erred, in that
it failed to apply the correct interpretation of the statute, and
concluded that since they had lived together for so long, well
they had to^bfe married - such is not the case with the mandate
with the State Legislature.
Appleeant respectfully requests that the ruling by
the lower Court be reversed with instructions to probate the
subject matter, with the Appellant as the sole heir.
Dated this 7 ^ day of October., 199T
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
to the Appellee, by personally delivering the same to WILLIAIl
J. DALGLIESH, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 243 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 303,
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84111, this 7th day of

JOHN WALSH
?T0RNEY AT LAW

ADDENDUM - 930439^-CA

WILLIAM J. M. DALGLIESH #810
24 3 EAST FOURTH SOUTH #30 3
SALT LAKE CITY^_IJTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 532-6536
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

:

ORDER DETERMINING VALIDITY
OF MARRIAGE

SUSAN RENAE SORENSEN GUSTAVESON, :
Case No- 922901280ES
Deceased.

:
Judge:

Richard Moffat

This natter came on regularly for trial on the 25th day of March, 1993,
before the Honorable Richard Moffat, one of the judges of the above-entitled
Court. Petitioner, Orin T. Sorensen appeared in person and with Counsel,
John Walsh.. Respondent, Martin Van Nood appeared in person and with
Counsel, William J. M. Dalgliesh. The matter at issue was an objection
filed by Martin Van Nood to the appointment of Orin T. Sorensen as the
personal rerpesentative of the Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson,
on the basis that Mr. Van Nood has priority of appointment as the
husband of the decedent, over that of Orin T. Sorensen, the brother
of the decedent, and to declare a valid marriage existed between
the decedent and Mr. Van Nood, under the provisons of §30-1-4.5,
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amsnded; and that the marriage
was legal and valid.

The Court, having heard the testimony of the petitioner,
the respondent, and numerous witnesses, and having considered the
evidence, including the exhibits submitted by the parties, and
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
be fully oognizant of the issues, new enters the foliating
Older:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. Martin Van Nood and Susan Renae Sorensen Gustaveson
entered into a contract of marriage which was legal and valid and
in effect at the date of Susan Renae Sorensen Gustavesonfs death,
and Martin Van Nood and Susan Renae Sorensen Gustaveson were husband
and wife at the date of the death of Susan Renae Sorensen Gustaveson.
2.

The determination of who should be the personal

representative of the Estate of Susan Renae Sorensen Gustaveson
is referred bade to the probate divsions of this Court for final
determination, to be made consistant with this Order,
Dated this

day of April, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Richard Moffat
District Court Judge
Approved as to form and content:

John WalshAttorney for Petitioner

CEKTIFiaffiE CF HAND DELIVERY

I, William J. M. Dalgliesh, do hereby certify that I
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
DETEIMTNING VMiTDITY CF MARRIAGE to Petitioner's attorney,
Jchn Walsh., at his office located at 2319 Feethill Drive, Suite 270,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, this 31st day of March, 1993.

Williar/J. M. Dalaliesh

WILLIAM J. M. DAiGLIESR #810
243 EAST FOURTH SOUTH #30 3
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801), 532-6536
ATTORNEY FOR
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF : FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
SUSAN RANAE SORENSEN GUSTAVESON:
Case No.922901280 ES
Deceased.
:
Judge:

Richard Moffat

This natter came en regularly for trial on the 25th day of March, 1993,
before the Honorable Ridaard Moffatt, one of the judges of the above-entitled
Court. Petitioner, Qrin T. Sorensen appeared in person and with Counsel,
John Walsh. Respondert, Martin Van Nood appeared in person and with
Counsel, William J. M* Dalgliesh. The matter at issue was an cbjection
filed by Martin Van Nood to the appointmant of Qrin T. Sorensen as the
personal representative of the Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson,
on the basis that Mr. Van Nood has priority of appointment as the
common law husband of the decedent, over that of Mr. Sorensen, the
brother of the decedent. The trial was held to declare that Mr. Van Nood
was the husband of the decedent, under the provisions of §30-1-4.5,
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended; and that the marriage was legal
and valid.

The Court, having heard the testdjiiony of the petitioner,
respondent and numerous other witnesses, and having considered the
evidence, including the exhibits submitted by the parties, and being
fully advised in the premises, new makes, adopts and ifles its:

FINDINGS CF FACT
1.

Respondent, Martin Van Nood, and the decedent, Susan

Gustaveson lived together on a constant basis, as husband and wife,
from June, 1988 until the death of Susan Gustaveson on October

19,

1992.
2.

Respondent and the decedent first lived together in the

hcne of the respondent, and then moved to the home of the decedent in
May, 1991, where they resided until Susan Gustaveson's death.
3. At the time the respondent and the decedent conmenced
residing together, the respondent was 41 years of age, and the
decedent was 36 years of age, both of legal age to contract a marriage.
4.

Both the respondent and the decedent were divorced from

other persons at the time they commenced their marriage relationship
with each other.

Respondents divorce frcm his first spouse was final on

October 1, 1982, and the decedentfs divorce from her first spouse
was final on February/ 22, 1982.
5.

This action was brought within one year following the

termination of the relationship of the respondent and the decedent,
said termination caused by the death of Susan Gustaveson.

6.

That the respondent and the decedent cohabited for a

period of approxiirately four and one half years; and had sexual
relations with. each, other during that time.
7. That the respondent and the decedent mutually assumed
maritial rights, duties, and obligations during their relationship,
in that they did the following acts together:
a.

They engaged in a sexual relationship.

b.

They maintained,'their home together for themselves

for four and one half years; and they raised the minor daughter of
the respondent together for threeyears, until she married and moved
from the family home. The decedent treated respondent's daughter
as her cwn daughter, .and considered respondent's grandchild as her
cwn grandchild.
c.

Each, contributed financial support to the household

expenses; and they purchased furniture and hone inprovements for
themselves.
d.

They received mail together.

e.

They exchanged gifts with each other and family

merrbers; and received gifts from family menbers.
f.

They shared in the normal household duties of

a married couple: cooking, cleaning, hone repairs, care of a child,
travel, entertainment both in the home and attendance of social
activities, outside of the hone with friends and co-workers.

g.

Ihe decedent contributed financial support to

the respondent's business by purchasing the business a computer,
h.

Ihey shared activities as husband and wife with

respondents child, such as camping, attendance as "parents'1 at
the child's high school graduation, marriage, and birth of her
child.
8. Ihe respondent and the decedent held themselves out and acquired
a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.in the following
manner:
a. Neighbors considered them to be husband and wife.
b.

Fellow co-workers and the employer of the decedent

and the former husband of the decedent and his parents regarded them
as husband and wife.
c.

Travel arrangements were made as husband and wife.

d.

Ihey shopped together as husband and wife for household

wares., and for a new hone.
e.

Ihey held themselves out as husband and wife to their

friends, relatives, and general public.
§.

Ihat the parties made an oral contract of marriage

between thaiiselves.
10. . That each was capable of giving consent to a marriage
between themselves.

. ..

11.

That the marriage of the respondent and the decedent

was not solemnized.
12.

That the respondent and the decedent were each legally

capable of entering inro a solemnized marriage under the provisions
of Title 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
13.

That Orin T. Sorensen is the brother of the decedent.

Frcm the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court new makes,
adopts and files its:
CCNCLUSICNS CF IM?

1. The Court has- jurisdiction in this matter.
2.

The respondent and the decedent entered into a marriage,

which was not solemnized, but which is a valid marriage.
3. That each was capable of giving consent to a solemnized
marriage.
4.

That each was legally capable of entering a solemnized

marriage under the provisions of Title 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.
5. That the parties cchabited.
6.

That each mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and

obligations.
7. That the respondent and the decedent held themselves
out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband
and wife.

8. That an Order and Judgment .should be entered, declaring
that Martin Van Nood and Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson ^here
validly married at the time and date of the death of Susan Ranae
Sorensen Gustaveson.
9.

That this matter should be referred back to the

probate calendar for determation of who should be the personal
representative of the Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson,
based upon the Order and Judgment to be entered herein.
Dated this

day of April, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

Richard Moffat
District Court Judge

Approved as to form and content:

John WalshAttorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICaTE OF HAND DELIVERY

I, William J, M. Dalgliesh, do hereby certify that I
caused to be hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions to Petitioner's attorney, John
Walsh, at his office located at 2319 Foothill Drive, Suite 270,
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84109, this J1

day of March, 1993.

Williaft J. M. Dalgliesh

